Minds and Machines 1 (2):167-84 (1991)
Ramsey, Stich and Garon's recent paper Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology claims a certain style of connectionism to be the final nail in the coffin of folk psychology. I argue that their paper fails to show this, and that the style of connectionism they illustrate can in fact supplement, rather than compete with, the claims of a theory of cognition based in folk psychology's ontology. Ramsey, Stich and Garon's argument relies on the lack of easily identifiable symbols inside the connectionist network they discuss, and they suggest that the existence of a system which behaves in a cognitively interesting way, but which cannot be explained by appeal to internal symbol processing, falsifies central assumptions of folk psychology. My claim is that this argument is flawed, and that the theorist need not discard folk psychology in order to accept that the network illustrated exhibits cognitively interesting behaviour, even if it is conceded that symbols cannot be readily identified within the network
|Keywords||Connectionism eliminativism propositional attitudes representation symbols|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief.Stephen P. Stich - 1983 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Semantic View of Theories.John Bickle - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (3):359-382.
On the Projectable Predicates of Connectionist Psychology: A Case for Belief.Paul Smolensky - 1995 - In C. Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.
Connectionism and the Causal Theory of Action Explanation.Scott R. Sehon - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):511-532.
Connectionist Minds.Andy Clark - 1995 - In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 83 - 102.
Beliefs, Functionally Discrete States, and Connectionist Networks.George Botterill - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (3):899-906.
Distributed Representation and Causal Modularity: A Rejoinder to Forster and Saidel.William Ramsey - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):453-61.
Connectionism, Eliminativism and the Future of Folk Psychology.William Ramsey, Stephen Stich & Joseph Garon - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:499-533.
Connectionism and the Fate of Folk Psychology: A Reply to Ramsey, Stich and Garon.Malcolm Forster & Eric Saidel - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):437 – 452.
Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology.William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & J. Garon - 1991 - In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 499-533.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads56 ( #94,090 of 2,171,850 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #326,616 of 2,171,850 )
How can I increase my downloads?