Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2599-2620 (2021)

Sam Clarke
University of Pennsylvania
Jerry Fodor deemed informational encapsulation ‘the essence’ of a system’s modularity and argued that human perceptual processing comprises modular systems, thus construed. Nowadays, his conclusion is widely challenged. Often, this is because experimental work is seen to somehow demonstrate the cognitive penetrability of perceptual processing, where this is assumed to conflict with the informational encapsulation of perceptual systems. Here, I deny the conflict, proposing that cognitive penetration need not have any straightforward bearing on the conjecture that perceptual processing is composed of nothing but informationally encapsulated modules, the conjecture that each and every perceptual computation is performed by an informationally encapsulated module, and the consequences perceptual encapsulation was traditionally expected to have for a perception-cognition border, the epistemology of perception and cognitive science. With these points in view, I propose that particularly plausible cases of cognitive penetration would actually seem to evince the encapsulation of perceptual systems rather than refute/problematize this conjecture.
Keywords Modularity  Cognitive Penetration  Mental Imagery  Jerry Fodor
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Reprint years 2020, 2021
DOI 10.1007/s11098-020-01565-1
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References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Image and Mind.Stephen Michael Kosslyn - 1980 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Number Sense Represents (Rational) Numbers.Sam Clarke & Jacob Beck - 2021 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44:1-57.
Is Pain Modular?Laurenz Casser & Sam Clarke - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
The Modularity of the Motor System.Myrto Mylopoulos - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):376-393.
Perceiving Agency.Mason Westfall - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
Numbers, Numerosities, and New Directions.Jacob Beck & Sam Clarke - 2021 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44:1-20.

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