Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):465 – 485 (2009)
This paper examines key aspects of Allan Gibbard's psychological account of moral activity. Inspired by evolutionary theory, Gibbard paints a naturalistic picture of morality mainly based on two specific types of emotion: guilt and anger. His sentimentalist and expressivist analysis is also based on a particular conception of rationality. I begin by introducing Gibbard's theory before testing some key assumptions underlying his system against recent empirical data and theories. The results cast doubt on some crucial aspects of Gibbard's philosophical theory, namely his reduction of morality to anger and guilt, and his theory of “normative governance.” Gibbard's particular version of expressivism may be undermined by these doubts
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References found in this work BETA
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Punitive Emotions and Norm Violations.Benoît Dubreuil - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):35 – 50.
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