How to Manipulate an Incompatibilistically Free Agent

American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):139-49 (2012)
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Abstract

Manipulation cases are usually seen as a problem for compatibilists, and a strength for incompatibilist theories. I present a new case of indirect manipulation, which I claim does not interfere with the manipulated agent's freedom under libertarian criteria. I argue that the only promising libertarian response to my case would undermine Widerker's response to Frankfurt cases, which I take to be the best libertarian strategy for dealing with Frankfurt-type manipulation. I outline a satisfactory compatibilist explanation of my case.

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Roger Clarke
Queen's University, Belfast

Citations of this work

Manipulation Arguments and Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1):57-73.
How Do Manipulation Arguments Work?John Martin Fischer - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):47-67.

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References found in this work

Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
God, freedom, and evil.Alvin Plantinga - 1978 - Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

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