American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):139-49 (2012)

Roger Clarke
Queen's University, Belfast
Manipulation cases are usually seen as a problem for compatibilists, and a strength for incompatibilist theories. I present a new case of indirect manipulation, which I claim does not interfere with the manipulated agent's freedom under libertarian criteria. I argue that the only promising libertarian response to my case would undermine Widerker's response to Frankfurt cases, which I take to be the best libertarian strategy for dealing with Frankfurt-type manipulation. I outline a satisfactory compatibilist explanation of my case.
Keywords Frankfurt cases  free will  compatibilism  libertarianism  moral responsibility  manipulation  alternative possibilities
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References found in this work BETA

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.

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Citations of this work BETA

Manipulation Arguments and Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1):57-73.
How Do Manipulation Arguments Work?John Fischer - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):47-67.

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