Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):308-327 (2020)

Philip Clark
University of Toronto, Mississauga
Cognitivists about intention hold that intending to do something entails believing you will do it. Non-cognitivists hold that intentions are conative states with no cognitive component. I argue that both of these claims are true. Intending entails the presence of a belief, even though the intention is not even partly the belief. The result is a form of what Sarah Paul calls Non-Inferential Weak Cognitivism, a view that, as she notes, has no prominent defenders.
Keywords Action  Intention  Belief  Noncognitivism  Cognitivism  Bratman  Velleman  Sarah Paul  Receptive  Directive
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12308
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References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Princeton University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.

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