III. Morals, Moore, and maclntyre

Inquiry 26 (4):425 – 445 (1983)
Abstract
Maclntyre's claim that contemporary moral language is, by traditional standards, merely chaotic somewhat exaggerates our chaos, and traditional order. He accuses. Moore and his disciples in particular of using moral language merely as propaganda, failing, like other critics, to reckon with the Platonic context of Moore's argument and the reasons why Goodness is an idea that rational inquiry should not abandon. Genuine moral action is done as the right thing, that produces more that is good than any alternative. Plato's model of the threefold structure of human motivation, and his image of the cave, locates moral action at a higher level than action from desire or social prejudice. We discover our real selves, distinct from our physical and social natures, in seeing what Goodness requires. This neo?Platonism is a better bet than Maclntyre allows, and an answer to the barbarian puppeteers he rightly condemns
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DOI 10.1080/00201748308602009
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References found in this work BETA
A Reply to My Critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Open Court.
The Abolition of Man.C. S. Lewis - 1947 - New York: the Macmillan Company.
Sexual Ontology and Group Marriage.Stephen R. L. Clark - 1983 - Philosophy 58 (224):215 - 227.

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