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Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021)
Abstract
To have free will is to have what it takes to act freely. When an agent acts freely—when she exercises her free will—what she does is up to her. A plurality of alternatives is open to her, and she determines which she pursues. When she does, she is an ultimate source or origin of her action. So runs a familiar conception of free will.Author Profiles
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Citations of this work
Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition.John Turri - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S3):403-424.
What is the Difference between Weakness of Will and Compulsion?August Gorman - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):37-52.
The disappearing agent objection to event-causal libertarianism.Derk Pereboom - 2012 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-11.
References found in this work
Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
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