Abstract

This paper contains an ‘affective picture’: a story, extensively supported by empirical data, about the way I take people to judge and behave morally; a picture in which the respective roles of reflective and affective processes are explained. According to this picture, different sorts of judgements have to be distinguished, some being cognitively more complex than others. ‘Sophisticated judgements’ are displayed at the level of rational considerations and allow for moral thinking, whereas ‘basic value judgements’ are a primitive and nonreflective way of assessing the world and are motivating. As we shall see, this affective picture has some consequences for the traditional internalismexternalism debate in philosophy; it highlights the fact that motivation is primarily linked to ‘basic value judgements’ and that the norms and judgements we openly defend do not have a particular effect on our actions, unless we are inclined to have an emotional attitude that conforms to them. Key words: affect, emotion, emotional reaction, externalism, internalism, justification, moral judgement, motivation, norm, value