Oxford University Press (2020)

Authors
Justin Clarke-Doane
Columbia University
Abstract
To what extent are the subjects of our thoughts and talk real? This is the question of realism. In this book, Justin Clarke-Doane explores arguments for and against moral realism and mathematical realism, how they interact, and what they can tell us about areas of philosophical interest more generally. He argues that, contrary to widespread belief, our mathematical beliefs have no better claim to being self-evident or provable than our moral beliefs. Nor do our mathematical beliefs have better claim to being empirically justified than our moral beliefs. It is also incorrect that reflection on the "genealogy" of our moral beliefs establishes a lack of parity between the cases. In general, if one is a moral antirealist on the basis of epistemological considerations, then one ought to be a mathematical antirealist as well. And, yet, Clarke-Doane shows that moral realism and mathematical realism do not stand or fall together -- and for a surprising reason. Moral questions, insofar as they are practical, are objective in a sense that mathematical questions are not. Moreover, the sense in which they are objective can be explained only by assuming practical anti-realism. One upshot of the discussion is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension. Another is that the objective questions in the neighborhood of questions of logic, modality, grounding, and nature are practical questions too. Practical philosophy should, therefore, take center stage.
Keywords math  moral  realism  logic  modal  pluralism  debunking  Benacerraf  disagreement  proof
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ISBN(s) 9780198823667   0198823665
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References found in this work BETA

Modal Security.Justin Clarke‐Doane & Dan Baras - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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Citations of this work BETA

Modal Security.Justin Clarke‐Doane & Dan Baras - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Set-Theoretic Pluralism and the Benacerraf Problem.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):2013-2030.
Evolution and Moral Realism.Kim Sterelny & Ben Fraser - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (4):981-1006.
A New Route From Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism.Olle Risberg & Folke Tersman - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2):189-207.

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