Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Similarity


Authors
Alfonso Anaya
University of Warwick
Sam Clarke
York University
Abstract
It has been claimed that naïve realism predicts phenomenological similarities where there are none and, thereby, mischaracterizes the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. If true, this undercuts a key motivation for the view. Here, we defend naïve realism against this charge, proposing that such arguments fail (three times over). In so doing, we highlight a more general problem with critiques of naïve realism that target the purported phenomenological predictions of the view. The problem is: naïve realism, broadly construed, doesn’t make phenomenological predictions of the required sort. So, as a result, opponents must resign themselves to attacking specific incarnations of naïve realism, or approach matters quite differently.
Keywords Naive Realism  Disjunctivism  Phenomenal Consciousness
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DOI 10.1080/0020174x.2019.1688183
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