Naïve realism and phenomenal similarity

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):885-902 (2023)
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Abstract

It has been claimed that naïve realism predicts phenomenological similarities where there are none and, thereby, mischaracterises the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. If true, this undercuts a key motivation for the view. Here, we defend naïve realism against this charge, proposing that such arguments fail (three times over). In so doing, we highlight a more general problem with critiques of naïve realism that target the purported phenomenological predictions of the view. The problem is: naïve realism, broadly construed, doesn’t make phenomenological predictions of the required sort. So, as a result, opponents must resign themselves to attacking specific incarnations of naïve realism, or approach matters quite differently.

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Author Profiles

Alfonso Anaya
University of Warsaw
Sam Clarke
University of Southern California

References found in this work

Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Sense and Sensibilia.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford University Press. Edited by G. Warnock.
Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion.William Fish - 2009 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.

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