Perspectival Direct Reference for Proper Names

Philosophia 39 (2):251-265 (2011)
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Abstract

I defend what I believe to be a new variation on Kripkean themes, for the purpose of providing an improved way to understand the referring functions of proper names. I begin by discussing roles played by perceptual perspectives in the use of proper names, and then broaden the discussion to include what I call cognitive perspectives. Although both types of perspectives underwrite the existence of intentional intermediaries between proper names and their referents, the existence of these intentional intermediaries does not entail that a Kripke-inspired view of direct reference must be abandoned. At the same time, the existence of these intermediaries can be seen to play illuminating roles as regards the referring functions of proper names in the following types of cases, among others: (a) where different names pick out the same subject; (b) where names are empty. Along the way, I argue that perspectival views are not something inside the head of language users as intended by Putnam in his well-known discussion of meaning

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References found in this work

Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
A System of Logic.John Stuart Mill - 1829/2002 - Longman.
Designation.Michael Devitt - 1981 - New York: Columbia University Press.
On sense and reference.Gottlob Frege - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel, Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 36--56.
Mind, Language and Reality.[author unknown] - 1975 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 39 (2):361-362.

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