Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3):362-381 (2017)
AbstractThe preface paradox does not show that it can be rational to have inconsistent beliefs, because preface writers do not have inconsistent beliefs. I argue, first, that a fully satisfactory solution to the preface paradox would have it that the preface writer's beliefs are consistent. The case here is on basic intuitive grounds, not the consequence of a theory of rationality or of belief. Second, I point out that there is an independently motivated theory of belief – sensitivism – which allows such a solution. I sketch a sensitivist account of the preface writer's doxastic state
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References found in this work
Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought.Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Oxford University Press UK.
Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press.