Qualia and the psychophysical explanation of color perception

Synthese 65 (December):377-405 (1985)
Abstract
Can psychology explain the qualitative content of experience? A persistent philosophical objection to that discipline is that it cannot. Qualitative states or " qualia " are argued to have characteristics which cannot be explained in terms of their relationships to other psychological states, stimuli, and behavior. Since psychology is confined to descriptions of such relationships, it seems that psychology cannot explain qualia
Keywords Experience  Perception  Psychology  Science
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DOI 10.1007/BF00869276
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References found in this work BETA

Science, Perception, and Reality.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - New York: Humanities Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Functionalism and Qualia.Sydney Shoemaker - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.
The Structure of Appearance.Nelson Goodman - 1951 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Towards a Computational Theory of Experience.Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):807-827.
Functionalism and Inverted Spectra.David J. Cole - 1990 - Synthese 82 (2):207-22.

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