Russell and the Temporal Contiguity of Causes and Effects

Erkenntnis 83 (6):1245-1264 (2018)
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Abstract

There are some necessary conditions on causal relations that seem to be so trivial that they do not merit further inquiry. Many philosophers assume that the requirement that there could be no temporal gaps between causes and their effects is such a condition. Bertrand Russell disagrees. In this paper, an in-depth discussion of Russell’s argument against this necessary condition is the centerpiece of an analysis of what is at stake when one accepts or denies that there can be temporal gaps between causes and effects. It is argued that whether one accepts or denies this condition, one is implicated in taking on substantial and wide-ranging philosophical positions. Therefore, it is not a trivial necessary condition of causal relations and it merits further inquiry.

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Author's Profile

Graham Clay
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Powers: The No-Successor Problem.John Pemberton - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (2):213-230.

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References found in this work

Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
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Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.

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