The Foundations of Capability Theory: Comparing Nussbaum and Gewirth [Book Review]

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):493-510 (2013)
Abstract
This paper is written from a perspective that is sympathetic to the basic idea of the capability approach. Our aim is to compare Martha Nussbaum’s capability theory of justice with Alan Gewirth’s moral theory, on two points: the selection and the justification of a list of central capabilities. On both counts, we contend that Nussbaum’s theory suffers from flaws that Gewirth’s theory may help to remedy. First, we argue that her notion of a (dignified) human life cannot fulfill the role of a normative criterion that Nussbaum wants it to play in selecting capabilities for her list. Second, we question whether Nussbaum’s method of justification is adequate, discussing both her earlier self-validating argumentative strategy and her more recent adherence to the device of an overlapping consensus. We conclude that both strategies fail to provide the capabilities theory with the firm foundation it requires. Next, we turn to Gewirth’s normative theory and discuss how it can repair these flaws. We show how his theory starts from a fundamental moral principle according to which all agents have rights to the protection of the necessary preconditions of their agency. Gewirth’s justification of this principle is then presented, using a version of a transcendental argument. Finally, we explicitly compare Nussbaum and Gewirth and briefly demonstrate what it would mean for Nussbaum to incorporate Gewirthian elements into her capabilities theory of justice
Keywords Capability approach  Selection of capabilities  Justification of capabilities  Martha Nussbaum  Alan Gewirth
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-012-9361-8
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References found in this work BETA
On Human Rights.James Griffin - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Reason and Morality.Alan Gewirth - 1968 - University of Chicago Press.
Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism.Martha C. Nussbaum - 2011 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (1):3-45.

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Citations of this work BETA
An Agency‐Based Capability Theory of Justice.Rutger Claassen - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
Nussbaum, Kant, and the Capabilities Approach to Dignity.Paul Formosa & Catriona Mackenzie - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):875-892.
Capability Paternalism.Rutger Claassen - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (1):57-73.
Why Health Matters to Justice: A Capability Theory Perspective.Lasse Nielsen - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):403-415.

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Civic Phronesis: Rawls' Anti-Sacrificial Ethics for Capability Justice.M. H. Mann - 2013 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 39 (1):21-43.
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Gewirth and the Voluntary Agent's Esteem of Purpose.Robert D. Heslep - 1985 - Philosophy Research Archives 11:379-391.
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