The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays

Oxford University Press (2015)

Authors
Michael McKenna
University of Arizona
Randolph Clarke
Florida State University
Angela Smith
Washington and Lee University
Abstract
What is it to be morally responsible for something? Recent philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement on the question. Indeed, some theorists claim to distinguish several varieties of moral responsibility, with different conditions that must be satisfied if one is to bear responsibility of one or another of these kinds. Debate on this point turns partly on disagreement about the kinds of responses made appropriate when one is blameworthy or praiseworthy. It is generally agreed that these include "reactive attitudes" such as resentment and gratitude, but theorists disagree about the nature of these attitudes. They dispute the connections between moral responsibility, desert, and the justification of punishment as well. Many theorists take it that, whatever the appropriate responses are, they are responses to an agent's "quality of will," but there is no consensus on what this comes to. Are the agent's beliefs about the moral status of her behavior what matter, or is it what she cares about, or what she judges important? This volume presents twelve original essays from participants in these debates. The contributors include prominent established figures as well as influential younger philosophers. A substantive introduction by the editors surveys recent debates and situates the contributions within it.
Keywords moral responsibility
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Reprint years 2018
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ISBN(s) 9780199998074   9780190883942   0199998078   0190883944
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Personal Autonomy.Sarah Buss - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
With Group Power Comes Great (Individual) Responsibility.Erin L. Miller - 2021 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 20 (1):22-44.

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