Ethics 111 (3):580–593 (2001)

Philip Clark
University of Toronto, Mississauga
People sometimes think they have reasons for action. On a certain naive view, what makes them true is a connection between the action and the agent’s good life. In a recent article, David Velleman argues for replacing this view with a more Kantian line, on which reasons are reasons in virtue of their connection with autonomy. The aim in what follows is to defend the naive view. I shall first raise some problems for Velleman's proposal and then fend off the objection that serves as his rationale for braving the depths of Kantianism.
Keywords Autonomist Internalism  Possibility of Practical Reason  autonomy
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DOI 10.1086/233527
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Formalism and Constitutivism in Kantian Practical Philosophy.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):163-176.
Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good.Kieran Setiya - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.
The Action as Conclusion.Philip Clark - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):481-505.

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