What Moore's Paradox Is About


Authors
Abstract
On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore's paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one for which the believer can have no non-overridden evidence. The arguments for this claim make use of some of Peter Klein's views on epistemic defeasibility. It is further suggested that this proposal may have important meta-epistemological implications
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/2653588
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 40,625
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 2000 - Westview Press.
Theory of Knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Puzzle of Metacoherence.Michael Huemer - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):1-21.
Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.
Moore’s Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis.John N. Williams - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What Moore’s Paradox Is About.Claudio De Almeida - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.
Moore's Paradox.Krista Lawlor & John Perry - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):421 – 427.
Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Justification.Robert Hambourger - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:1-12.
Moore’s Paradoxes and Conscious Belief.John Nicholas Williams - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.
Moore's Paradox and Self-Ascribed Belief.Byeong D. Lee - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (3):359-370.
Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore’s Paradox.Jordi Fernández - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.
Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
Shoemaker, Self-Blindness and Moore's Paradox.Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48.
Assertion and Belief.Charles Sayward - 1966 - Philosophical Studies 17 (5):74 - 78.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-08-24

Total views
87 ( #87,506 of 2,242,253 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #57,191 of 2,242,253 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature