Inference, practice and theory

Synthese 34 (1):89 - 132 (1977)
Abstract
Reichenbach held that all scientific inference reduces, via probability calculus, to induction, and he held that induction can be justified. He sees scientific knowledge in a practical context and insists that any rational assessment of actions requires a justification of induction. Gaps remain in his justifying argument; for we can not hope to prove that induction will succeed if success is possible. However, there are good prospects for completing a justification of essentially the kind he sought by showing that while induction may succeed, no alternative is a rational way of trying.Reichenbach's claim that probability calculus, especially via Bayes' Theorem, can help to exhibit the structure of inference to theories is a valuable insight. However, his thesis that the weighting of all hypotheses rests only on frequency data is too restrictive, especially given his scientific realism. Other empirical factors are relevant. Any satisfactory account of scientific inference must be deeply indebted to Reichenbach's foundation work.
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Reprint years 1997
DOI 10.1007/BF00485637
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References found in this work BETA

Objective Knowledge.Karl R. Popper - 1972 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Models and Metaphors.Max Black - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
The Foundations of Scientific Inference.Wesley C. Salmon - 1966 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
The Theory of Probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1949 - Berkeley: University of California Press.
The Continuum of Inductive Methods.Rudolf Carnap - 1952 - University of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Rationality of Method Verssus Historical Relativism.F. John Clendinnen - 1983 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 14 (1):23-38.
Clendinnen and Salmon on Induction as the Non-Arbitrary Method.A. A. Derksen - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):72 – 84.

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