The other hard problem: How to bridge the gap between subsymbolic and symbolic cognition

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):22-23 (1998)
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Abstract

The constructivist notion that features are purely functional is incompatible with the classical computational metaphor of mind. I suggest that the discontent expressed by Schyns, Goldstone and Thibaut about fixed-features theories of categorization reflects the growing impact of connectionism, and show how their perspective is similar to recent research on implicit learning, consciousness, and development. A hard problem remains, however: How to bridge the gap between subsymbolic and symbolic cognition

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