A problem for the alternative difference measure of confirmation

Philosophical Studies 164 (3):643-651 (2013)

Authors
Nevin Climenhaga
Australian Catholic University
Abstract
Among Bayesian confirmation theorists, several quantitative measures of the degree to which an evidential proposition E confirms a hypothesis H have been proposed. According to one popular recent measure, s, the degree to which E confirms H is a function of the equation P(H|E) − P(H|~E). A consequence of s is that when we have two evidential propositions, E1 and E2, such that P(H|E1) = P(H|E2), and P(H|~E1) ≠ P(H|~E2), the confirmation afforded to H by E1 does not equal the confirmation afforded to H by E2. I present several examples that demonstrate the unacceptability of this result, and conclude that we should reject s (and other measures that share this feature) as a measure of confirmation.
Keywords Confirmation  Evidence  Bayesian epistemology  Probability
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9872-0
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

Simplicity as a Criterion of Theory Choice in Metaphysics.Andrew Brenner - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2687-2707.
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