Developing a Post-Prior Taxonomy of Ethical Sentences

Philosophia 43 (3):801-820 (2015)
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Abstract

The main guiding assumption of this paper is that there is need for a taxonomy of ethical sentences that does not overgenerate, yet can make useful contributions to debates about certain controversial sentences . After surveying the recent literature and concluding that no extant taxonomy that satisfies both of these conditions is available to us, I propose and explain a novel taxonomy which does satisfy them. I then defend my proposal from five potential objections.

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Patrick Clipsham
Winona State University

Citations of this work

The Limits of Self-Effacement: A Reply to Wittwer.Patrick Clipsham - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3617-3636.

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References found in this work

Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Fred Feldman & J. L. Mackie - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (1):134.
Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it.Ronald Dworkin - 1996 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (2):87-139.
Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine.Matthew H. Kramer - 2009 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Attitudes and contents.Simon Blackburn - 1988 - Ethics 98 (3):501-517.

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