Epistemic levels and the problem of the criterion

Philosophical Studies 88 (2):109-140 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The problem of the criterion says that we can know a proposition only if we first know a criterion of truth and vice versa, hence, we cannot know any proposition or any criterion of truth. The epistemic levels response says that since knowledge does not require knowledge about knowledge, we can know a proposition without knowing a criterion of truth. This response (advocated by Chisholm and Van Cleve) presupposes that criteria of truth are epistemic principles. In general, however, criteria of truth are not epistemic principles, so the epistemic levels response to the problem of the criterion fails

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,480

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
80 (#150,311)

6 months
2 (#277,663)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Andrew Cling
University of Alabama, Huntsville

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references