The definability of objective becoming in Minkowski spacetime

Synthese 103 (3):355 - 387 (1995)
In his recent article On Relativity Theory and Openness of the Future (1991), Howard Stein proves not only that one can define an objective becoming relation in Minkowski spacetime, but that there is only one possible definition available if one accepts certain natural assumptions about what it is for becoming to occur and for it to be objective. Stein uses the definition supplied by his proof to refute an argument due to Rietdijk (1966, 1976), Putnam (1967) and Maxwell (1985, 1988) that Minkowski spacetime leaves no room for objective becoming whatsoever. However, Stein's proof does not seem to go far enough. By considering only what events have become from the standpoint of any given event, Stein's uniqueness proof fails from the outset to allow for a more general kind of becoming whereby it is understood to occur from the standpoint of events on the particular worldlines followed by observers. This suggests that there may, after all, be more than one way to define objective becoming in Minkowski spacetime once each observer's worldline is allowed to figure in the definition. This suspicion is further aroused by two recent proposals for objective, worldline-dependent becoming due to Peacock (1992) and Muller (1992) who advocate ways of defining becoming that are not equivalent to the definition Stein's uniqueness proof delivers. Nevertheless, we show that Stein's uniqueness proofcan be extended in a natural way to cover this more general kind of becoming, provided one does not enrich standard Minkowski spacetime by privileging certain sets of worldlines over others in an unwarranted manner. Thus we aim to reinforce Stein's point that standard Minkowski spacetime does make room for objective becoming, but in essentially only one way, despite arguments and proposals to the contrary.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01089733
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References found in this work BETA
Hilary Putnam (1967). Time and Physical Geometry. Journal of Philosophy 64 (8):240-247.

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Citations of this work BETA
John Earman (2008). Reassessing the Prospects for a Growing Block Model of the Universe. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (2):135 – 164.
Simon Saunders (2002). How Relativity Contradicts Presentism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:277-.
Mauro Dorato (2002). On Becoming, Cosmic Time and Rotating Universes. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:253-.
James Harrington (2007). Special Relativity and the Future: A Defense of the Point Present. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 39 (1):82-101.

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