Philosophical Studies 140 (3):401 - 421 (2008)

Andrew Cling
University of Alabama, Huntsville
The best extant statement of the epistemic regress problem makes assumptions that are too strong. An improved version assumes only that that reasons require support, that no proposition is supported only by endless regresses of reasons, and that some proposition is supported. These assumptions are individually plausible but jointly inconsistent. Attempts to explain support by means of unconceptualized sensations, contextually immunized propositions, endless regresses, and holistic coherence all require either additional reasons or an external condition on support that is arbitrary from the believer's own point of view.
Keywords Regress  Skepticism  Reasons  Foundationalism  Coherence  Contextualism  Infinitism  Paradox
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9152-6
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Theory of Knowledge.Roderick Milton Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.

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