Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3617-3636 (2021)

Patrick Clipsham
Winona State University
This article is concerned with the interconnection between three arguments: the Moral Explanatory Dispensability Argument, the Epistemic Explanatory Dispensability Argument, and the Companions in Guilt Argument. Silvan Wittwer has recently argued that the Epistemic EDA is self-effacing, whereas the Moral EDA is not. This difference between them is then leveraged by Wittwer to establish that there is a significant disparity between these arguments and that this disparity undermines attempts to use the CGA as a means of refuting the Moral EDA. After explaining the connections between these arguments, I provide three different responses to Wittwer’s analysis. First, I develop a plausible case in favor of the conclusion that the Moral EDA is also self-effacing. Second, I defend the Epistemic EDA from the charge of self-effacement and respond to Wittwer’s assertion that my preferred method of escaping his argument is dialectically inappropriate. Finally, I explain how some arguments recently articulated by Richard Rowland and Ramon Das support my objections to Wittwer’s self-effacement argument.
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-021-01617-0
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Morality and Mathematics.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2020 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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