On the Relationship between Reasons and Evidence


How are reasons and evidence interrelated? According to one prevalent view, reasons and evidence are equivalent: evidence is a reason, and a reason is evidence. On another view reasons and evidence are conditionally related: if there is evidence, then there is a reason. On a different view reasons and evidence are disjunctively related: reasons or evidence can be substituted for each other. In this paper, I argue against these common views, and I defend the view that reasons and evidence are conjunctively related: evidence and reasons are distinguishable yet inseparable. I argue reasons and evidence are distinct because they come apart in certain cases, and I argue reasons and evidence are inseparable because only when properly conjoined are they capable of yielding correct verdicts on important cases in epistemology.



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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
Having reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71.

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