Perspectives on Science 16 (3):pp. 265-279 (2008)

Sharyn Clough
Oregon State University
In assessing the appropriateness of a scientific community's research effort, Solomon considers a number of "decision vectors," divided into the empirical and non-empirical. Value judgments get sorted as non-empirical vectors. By way of contrast, I introduce Anderson's discussion of the evidential role of value judgments. Like Anderson, I argue that value judgments are empirical in the relevant sense. I argue further that Solomon's decision matrix needs to be reconceptualized: the distinction should not be between the empirical vs. non-empirical, but between the relevant vs. irrelevant. Whether particular value judgments are relevant or not is an empirical question, to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Keywords Values  Feminism  Empiricism
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DOI 10.1162/posc.2008.16.3.265
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References found in this work BETA

A Question of Evidence.Lynn Hankinson Nelson - 1993 - Hypatia 8 (2):172 - 189.

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Citations of this work BETA

Feminist Theories of Evidence and Research Communities: A Reply to Goldenberg.Sharyn Clough - 2013 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (12):xx-yy.
Autonomy and Objectivity of Science.Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen - 2012 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (3):309-334.

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