The Evidential Weight of Considered Moral Judgments

Dissertation, San Jose State University (2009)
Abstract
The input objection to reflective equilibrium (RE) claims that the method fails as a method of moral justification. According to the objection considered moral judgments(CMJs) are not truth‐conducive. Because the method uses inputs that are not credible the method does not generate justified moral beliefs. I solve the input objection by reinterpreting RE using contemporary developments in ethical intuitionism. In the first half of the thesis I setup the input objection, explore potential responses to the objection and uncover the best way to solve the objection. The second half of the thesis solves the input objection by defining key terms, detailing the revised RE procedure, reinserting the notion of a competent moral judge into the method, using intuitionist criteria for identifying genuine moral intuitions, creating three filters capable of sorting good from bad CMJs, and showing how it is possible to assign evidential weight to CMJs so that they can be used as standards against which moral principles can be measured and a justified moral theory realized.
Keywords Reflective Equilibrium  Moral Epistemology  Considered Judgments
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