A new defence of doxasticism about delusions: The cognitive phenomenological defence

Mind and Language 33 (2):198-217 (2018)

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Abstract
Clinicians and cognitive scientists typically conceive of delusions as doxastic—they view delusions as beliefs. But some philosophers have countered with anti-doxastic objections: delusions cannot be beliefs because they fail the necessary conditions of belief. A common response involves meeting these objections on their own terms by accepting necessary conditions on belief but trying to blunt their force. I take a different approach by invoking a cognitive-phenomenal view of belief and jettisoning the rational/behavioural conditions. On this view, the anti-doxastic claims can be rejected outright, and doxasticism can be defended. I call this the cognitive phenomenological defence of doxasticism.
Keywords belief  cognitive phenomenology  delusion  doxasticism  mechanistic explanation  realism
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DOI 10.1111/mila.12164
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