Mind and Language 33 (2):198-217 (2018)
AbstractClinicians and cognitive scientists typically conceive of delusions as doxastic—they view delusions as beliefs. But some philosophers have countered with anti-doxastic objections: delusions cannot be beliefs because they fail the necessary conditions of belief. A common response involves meeting these objections on their own terms by accepting necessary conditions on belief but trying to blunt their force. I take a different approach by invoking a cognitive-phenomenal view of belief and jettisoning the rational/behavioural conditions. On this view, the anti-doxastic claims can be rejected outright, and doxasticism can be defended. I call this the cognitive phenomenological defence of doxasticism.
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Citations of this work
Self-Deception and the Second Factor: How Desire Causes Delusion in Anorexia Nervosa.Stephen Gadsby - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):609-626.
Delusions, Harmful Dysfunctions, and Treatable Conditions.Peter Clutton & Stephen Gadsby - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (2):167-181.
Framing the Epistemic Schism of Statistical Mechanics.Javier Anta - 2021 - Proceedings of the X Conference of the Spanish Society of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.
Understanding Delusions: Evidence, Reason, and Experience.Chenwei Nie - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Warwick
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