Ethical Internalism and Cognitive Theories of Motivation

Philosophical Studies 129 (2):295-315 (2006)
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Abstract

Cognitive internalism is the view that moral judgments are both cognitive and motivating. Philosophers have found cognitive internalism to be attractive in part because it seems to offer support for the idea that moral reasons are categorical, that is, independent of agents’ desires. In this paper, I argue that it offers no such support.

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References found in this work

The Moral Problem.Michael Smith (ed.) - 1994 - Wiley.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.

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