Explaining the Value of Truth

American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):105-115 (2009)
Abstract
Truth is a value in that sense that a belief is good (or successful, or correct) just in case it is true. But it does not follow that truth is a good-making property, nor does it follow that the nature of truth explains its value. Instead, this paper argues that the nature of belief explains its value.
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Is Truth Valuable?Ryan Christensen - 2013 - Philosophy 88 (3):451-466.

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