Explaining the Value of Truth

American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):105-115 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Truth is a value in that sense that a belief is good (or successful, or correct) just in case it is true. But it does not follow that truth is a good-making property, nor does it follow that the nature of truth explains its value. Instead, this paper argues that the nature of belief explains its value.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 104,101

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):89-107.
Truth as the Good in the Way of Belief.Michael P. Lynch - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):377-388.
A new argument for evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
Horwich on the Value of Truth.Byeong D. Lee - 2020 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 27 (2):263–279.
On the Value and Nature of Truth.Gurpreet Rattan - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Research 33:235-251.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-05-10

Downloads
143 (#163,402)

6 months
10 (#363,467)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Allen Coates
East Tennessee State University

Citations of this work

Truth is not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable.Chase B. Wrenn - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):108-128.
Is Truth Valuable?Ryan Christensen - 2013 - Philosophy 88 (3):451-466.
Pragmatism about Truth-Makers.John Capps - 2022 - Contemporary Pragmatism 19 (4):350-370.

Add more citations

References found in this work

True to Life: Why Truth Matters.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Philosophy 80 (314):601-604.
Epistemic Goals and Epistemic Values.Stephen R. Grimm - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):725-744.
The value of truth.Paul Horwich - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):347–360.

Add more references