Meaning, mistake, and miscalculation

Minds and Machines 7 (2):171-97 (1997)
The issue of what distinguishes systems which have original intentionalityfrom those which do not has been brought into sharp focus by Saul Kripke inhis discussion of the sceptical paradox he attributes to Wittgenstein.In this paper I defend a sophisticated version of the dispositionalistaccount of meaning against the principal objection raised by Kripke in hisattack on dispositional views. I argue that the objection put by the sceptic,to the effect that the dispositionalist cannot give a satisfactory account ofnormativity and mistake, in fact comprises a number of distinct lines ofargument, all of which can be satisfactorily answered by the dispositionalist
Keywords Epistemology  Meaning  Normativity  Scepticism  Kripke, S
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DOI 10.1023/A:1008207502580
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