Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007)
Experiences of all kinds have a distinctive character, which marks them out as intrinsically different from states of consciousness such as thinking. A plausible view is that the difference should be accounted for by the fact that, in having an experience, the subject is somehow immediately aware of a range of phenomenal qualities. For example, in seeing, grasping and tasting an apple, the subject may be aware of a red and green spherical shape, a certain feeling of smoothness to touch, and a sweet sensation. Such phenomenal qualities are also immediately present in hallucinations. According to the sense-data theory, phenomenal qualities belong to items called “sense-data.” In having a perceptual experience the subject is directly aware of, or acquainted with, a sense-datum, even if the experience is illusory or hallucinatory. The sense-datum is an object immediately present in experience. It has the qualities it appears to have
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Materialism and Phenomenal Qualities II.D. H. Mellor - 1973 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 47 (July):107-19.
Materialism and Phenomenal Qualities.L. C. Holborow - 1973 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 47 (July):107-19.
Notes for Lectures on Private Experience and Sense Data.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (July):275-320.
Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities.Alex Byrne - 2011 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads166 ( #27,512 of 2,164,579 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #347,995 of 2,164,579 )
How can I increase my downloads?