Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice

Episteme 7 (2):101-113 (2010)
Authors
David Coady
University of Tasmania
Abstract
I describe two concepts of epistemic injustice. The first of these concepts is explained through a critique of Alvin Goldman's veritistic social epistemology. The second is closely based on Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice. I argue that there is a tension between these two forms of epistemic injustice and tentatively suggest some ways of resolving the tension.
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DOI 10.3366/epi.2010.0001
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References found in this work BETA

The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition.William James - 1967 - New York: University of Chicago Press.
Rational Authority and Social Power: Towards a Truly Social Epistemology.Miranda Fricker - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):159–177.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare: A Philosophical Analysis.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2014 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (4):529-540.
An Interview with Miranda Fricker.Susan Dieleman - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (2):253-261.

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