Abstract

Two goods are incommensurable just in case neither is better than the other, nor are they equal. Incommensurable goods pose two problems: determining which goods are incommensurable, and deciding how to make choices over those that are. In this dissertation, I develop a theory of value and show how it solves these two problems. An item is good, I argue, insofar as there are reasons to choose it. Accordingly, the comparative value of two goods depends upon the reasons for choosing between them. I then argue that goods are commensurable when practical reason supports certain patterns of choice over them, and that they are incommensurable when it supports certain other patterns. We therefore have reason to think goods are incommensurable when our practical reasons commit us to certain patterns of choice over them. This result solves both problems: practical reason not only tells us when goods are incommensurable, but does so by telling us how to make choices over them