Identity, Leibniz’s Law and Non-Transitive Reasoning

Metaphysica 14 (2):253-264 (2013)
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Abstract

Arguments based on Leibniz's Law seem to show that there is no room for either indefinite or contingent identity. The arguments seem to prove too much, but their conclusion is hard to resist if we want to keep Leibniz's Law. We present a novel approach to this issue, based on an appropriate modification of the notion of logical consequence.

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Citations of this work

Introduction: Vagueness and Ontology.Geert Keil - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (2):149-164.
The proper treatment of identity in dialetheic metaphysics.Nicholas K. Jones - 2020 - The Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):65-92.
Leibnizian Identity and Paraconsistent Logic.Ali Abasnezhad - 2020 - History and Philosophy of Logic 41 (3):236-243.

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References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Sameness and substance.David Wiggins - 1980 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is.Graham Priest - 2008 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
A New Introduction to Modal Logic.M. J. Cresswell & G. E. Hughes - 1996 - New York: Routledge. Edited by M. J. Cresswell.

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