Paraconsistent vagueness: a positive argument

Synthese 183 (2):211-227 (2010)
Abstract
Paraconsistent approaches have received little attention in the literature on vagueness (at least compared to other proposals). The reason seems to be that many philosophers have found the idea that a contradiction might be true (or that a sentence and its negation might both be true) hard to swallow. Even advocates of paraconsistency on vagueness do not look very convinced when they consider this fact; since they seem to have spent more time arguing that paraconsistent theories are at least as good as their paracomplete counterparts, than giving positive reasons to believe on a particular paraconsistent proposal. But it sometimes happens that the weakness of a theory turns out to be its mayor ally, and this is what (I claim) happens in a particular paraconsistent proposal known as subvaluationism. In order to make room for truth-value gluts subvaluationism needs to endorse a notion of logical consequence that is, in some sense, weaker than standard notions of consequence. But this weakness allows the subvaluationist theory to accommodate higher-order vagueness in a way that it is not available to other theories of vagueness (such as, for example, its paracomplete counterpart, supervaluationism).
Keywords Logical Consequence  Paraconsistency  Vagueness  Subvaluationism  Higher-order vagueness  Gap-principles
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9760-0
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References found in this work BETA
Modal Logic.Patrick Blackburn, Maarten de Rijke & Yde Venema - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Routledge.
Vagueness, Truth and Logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
A Model of Tolerance.Elia Zardini - 2008 - Studia Logica 90 (3):337-368.

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Citations of this work BETA
Vagueness: Subvaluationism.Pablo Cobreros - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):472-485.
Constructing Worlds.Mark Jago - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):59-74.
Sex, Vagueness, and the Olympics.Helen L. Daly - 2015 - Hypatia 30 (4):708-724.
Voting and Vagueness.James Kennedy Chase - forthcoming - Synthese:1-16.

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