Journal of Philosophy 97 (5):278-296 (2000)
AbstractWe focus here on some familiar kinds of cases of conflict between friendship and morality, and, on the basis of our account of the nature of friendship, argue for the following two claims: first, that in some cases where we are led morally astray by virtue of a relationship that makes its own demands on us, the relationship in question is properly called a friendship; second, that relationships of this kind are valuable in their own right.
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Citations of this work
Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge.Paulina Sliwa - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):393-418.
Formalism and Constitutivism in Kantian Practical Philosophy.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):163-176.
A Good Friend Will Help You Move a Body: Friendship and the Problem of Moral Disagreement.Daniel Koltonski - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (4):473-507.
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