Logical atomism, nominalism, and modal logic

Synthese 31 (1):23 - 62 (1975)
While operators for logical necessity and possibility represent "internal" conditions of propositions (or of their corresponding states of affairs), These conditions will be "formal", As is required by logical atomism, And not "material" in content if from the (pseudo) semantical point of view the modal operators range over "all the possible worlds" of a logical space rather than over arbitrary non-Empty sets of worlds (as is usually done in modal logic). Some of the implications of this requirement are noted and though several variants of realist logical atomism are distinguished and discussed, The theory of logical form developed is nominalist. Many of nominalism's difficulties and inadequacies become transparent in the context of logical atomism and are so noted
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DOI 10.1007/BF00869470
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Naming and Saying.Wilfrid Sellars - 1962 - Philosophy of Science 29 (1):7-26.
Replies.W. V. Quine - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):264 - 322.
Negotiation and Generality.Herbert Hochberg - 1969 - Noûs 3 (3):325-343.

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