Non-evidential believing and permissivism about evidence: a reply to Dan-Johan Eklund

Religious Studies (1):1-9 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In response to John Bishop's (2007) account of passionally caused believing, Dan-Johan Eklund (2014) argues that conscious non-evidential believing is (conceptually) impossible, that is, it's (conceptually) impossible consciously to believe that p whilst acknowledging that the relevant evidence doesn't support p's being true, for it conflicts with belief being a truth-oriented attitude, or so he argues. In this article, we present Eklund's case against Bishop's account of passionally caused believing, and we argue that it's unpersuasive, at least to those who accept permissivism about evidence, that is, that it's possible for there to be more than one rational response to a given body of evidence. We do this through a novel application of a case of nurtured belief, that is, of a person holding a belief simply because she was caused to do so by her upbringing, and we use it to show exactly where Eklund's argument goes wrong. We conclude by drawing a general lesson drawn from this debate: if permissivism about evidence is true, then belief being truth-oriented is consistent with non-evidential believing being possible.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,101

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On justifying and being justified.Adam Leite - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):219–253.
Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.
The illusion of discretion.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1635-1665.
Believing at Will is Possible.Rik Peels - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.
Necessarily Adequate Evidence about Other Minds.T. Greenwood - 1972 - Philosophy 47 (182):359 - 370.
Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
What does it take to "have" a reason?Mark Schroeder - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 201--22.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-10-16

Downloads
60 (#199,452)

6 months
2 (#296,374)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

David Efird
PhD: Oxford University; Last affiliation: University of York
Jack Warman
Universidad de La Frontera
Daniel Molto
University of Sussex
1 more

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations