Religious Studies (1):1-9 (2015)

Authors
David Efird
University of York
Jack Warman
Universidad de La Frontera
Daniel Molto
University of Sussex
1 more
Abstract
In response to John Bishop's (2007) account of passionally caused believing, Dan-Johan Eklund (2014) argues that conscious non-evidential believing is (conceptually) impossible, that is, it's (conceptually) impossible consciously to believe that p whilst acknowledging that the relevant evidence doesn't support p's being true, for it conflicts with belief being a truth-oriented attitude, or so he argues. In this article, we present Eklund's case against Bishop's account of passionally caused believing, and we argue that it's unpersuasive, at least to those who accept permissivism about evidence, that is, that it's possible for there to be more than one rational response to a given body of evidence. We do this through a novel application of a case of nurtured belief, that is, of a person holding a belief simply because she was caused to do so by her upbringing, and we use it to show exactly where Eklund's argument goes wrong. We conclude by drawing a general lesson drawn from this debate: if permissivism about evidence is true, then belief being truth-oriented is consistent with non-evidential believing being possible.
Keywords Permissivism  Fideism  Passional beliefs
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1017/S0034412515000517
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References found in this work BETA

Faith as Doxastic Venture.John Bishop - 2002 - Religious Studies 38 (4):471-487.
Can Faith Be a Doxastic Venture?Andrei A. Buckareff - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (4):435-445.

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