Discurso 34:145-202 (2004)

Luciano Codato
University of São Paulo (PhD)
Since Kant interprets the logical form of judgment as a subordination of concepts' extensions, how should we understand their relationship to an unknown = x? Against traditional interpretations, elaborated from the background either of analytic philosophy or of Port-Royal Logic, one recovers the specificity of Kant’s notion of extension. It is necessary to distinguish: (1) the predicative relationship between the superior concept P and the inferior concept S, (2) the non-predicative relationship between the intuition of something individual = x and the universals S and P. As a result, one finds out both the reflective and the determinative character of the relationship among universal, particular and singular in judgment.
Keywords Kant  judgment  logical form  extension
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DOI 10.11606/issn.2318-8863.discurso.2004.62839
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