Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (4):2051-2068 (2020)

Authors
Mark Coeckelbergh
University of Vienna
Abstract
This paper discusses the problem of responsibility attribution raised by the use of artificial intelligence technologies. It is assumed that only humans can be responsible agents; yet this alone already raises many issues, which are discussed starting from two Aristotelian conditions for responsibility. Next to the well-known problem of many hands, the issue of “many things” is identified and the temporal dimension is emphasized when it comes to the control condition. Special attention is given to the epistemic condition, which draws attention to the issues of transparency and explainability. In contrast to standard discussions, however, it is then argued that this knowledge problem regarding agents of responsibility is linked to the other side of the responsibility relation: the addressees or “patients” of responsibility, who may demand reasons for actions and decisions made by using AI. Inspired by a relational approach, responsibility as answerability thus offers an important additional, if not primary, justification for explainability based, not on agency, but on patiency.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11948-019-00146-8
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 55,873
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On the Morality of Artificial Agents.Luciano Floridi & J. W. Sanders - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (3):349-379.
Killer Robots.Robert Sparrow - 2007 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (1):62–77.
The Other Question: Can and Should Robots Have Rights?David J. Gunkel - 2018 - Ethics and Information Technology 20 (2):87-99.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

There Is No Techno-Responsibility Gap.Daniel W. Tigard - forthcoming - Philosophy and Technology:1-19.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Utilitarian Epistemology.Steve Petersen - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1173-1184.
Responsibility Without Consciousness.Nicola Lacey - 2016 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 36 (2):219-241.
Artificial Free Will: The Responsibility Strategy and Artificial Agents.Sven Delarivière - 2016 - Apeiron Student Journal of Philosophy (Portugal) 7:175-203.
Epistemic Responsibility.J. Angelo Corlett - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):179 – 200.
Responsibility and Obligation: Some Kantian Directions.Suzanne M. Uniacke - 2005 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (4):461 – 475.
On the Legal Responsibility of Autonomous Machines.Bartosz Brożek & Marek Jakubiec - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (3):293-304.
Artificial Moral Agents Are Infeasible with Foreseeable Technologies.Patrick Chisan Hew - 2014 - Ethics and Information Technology 16 (3):197-206.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-10-25

Total views
43 ( #231,967 of 2,401,777 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #56,926 of 2,401,777 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes