Philosophy and Technology 27 (1):61-77 (2014)

Authors
Mark Coeckelbergh
University of Vienna
Abstract
Should we give moral standing to machines? In this paper, I explore the implications of a relational approach to moral standing for thinking about machines, in particular autonomous, intelligent robots. I show how my version of this approach, which focuses on moral relations and on the conditions of possibility of moral status ascription, provides a way to take critical distance from what I call the “standard” approach to thinking about moral status and moral standing, which is based on properties. It does not only overcome epistemological problems with the standard approach, but can also explain how we think about, experience, and act towards machines—including the gap that sometimes occurs between reasoning and experience. I also articulate the non-Cartesian orientation of my “relational” research program and specify the way it contributes to a different paradigm in thinking about moral standing and moral knowledge
Keywords Moral standing  Moral status  Moral relations  Moral knowledge  Robots  Machines  Descartes  Levinas: modernity  Moral change  Phenomenology
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DOI 10.1007/s13347-013-0133-8
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References found in this work BETA

Animal Liberation.Peter Singer (ed.) - 1977 - Avon Books.
Totality and Infinity.Emmanuel Levinas - 1961/1969 - Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
The Case for Animal Rights.Tom Regan - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Noûs. Oxford University Press. pp. 425-434.
When Species Meet.Donna J. Haraway - 2007 - Univ of Minnesota Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

What do we owe to intelligent robots?John-Stewart Gordon - 2020 - AI and Society 35 (1):209-223.

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