Alfred Mele's metaphysical freedom?

Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194 (2007)
In this paper we raise three questions of clarification about Alfred Mele's fine recent book, Free Will and Luck. Our questions concern the following topics: (i) Mele's combination of 'luck' and 'Frankfurt-style' objections to libertarianism, (ii) Mele's stipulations about 'compatibilism' and the relation between questions about free action and questions about moral responsibility, and (iii) Mele's treatment of the Consequence Argument.
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DOI 10.1080/13869790701306010
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References found in this work BETA
Peter van Inwagen (2000). Free Will Remains a Mystery. Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
Ted Warfield (2003). Compatibilism and Incompatibilism : Some Arguments. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
E. J. Coffman (2010). How (Not) to Attack the Luck Argument. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166.

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