Alfred Mele's metaphysical freedom?

Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194 (2007)
Abstract
In this paper we raise three questions of clarification about Alfred Mele's fine recent book, Free Will and Luck. Our questions concern the following topics: (i) Mele's combination of 'luck' and 'Frankfurt-style' objections to libertarianism, (ii) Mele's stipulations about 'compatibilism' and the relation between questions about free action and questions about moral responsibility, and (iii) Mele's treatment of the Consequence Argument.
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DOI 10.1080/13869790701306010
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References found in this work BETA
Free Will Remains a Mystery.Peter van Inwagen - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
Compatibilism and Incompatibilism : Some Arguments.Ted Warfield - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Moral Responsibility and the Continuation Problem.Alfred Mele - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):237-255.
How (Not) to Attack the Luck Argument.E. J. Coffman - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166.

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Similar books and articles
Good Luck to Libertarians.Dana K. Nelkin - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):173 – 184.
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.
Is It All Just a Matter of Luck?Timothy O'Connor - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):157 – 161.
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
On Alfred Mele's Free Will and Luck.Derk Pereboom - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):163 – 172.
How (Not) to Attack the Luck Argument.E. J. Coffman - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166.

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