Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):499-504 (2009)
Many philosophers hold that luck excludes control-more precisely, that an event is lucky for you only if that event lies beyond your control. Call this the Lack of Control Requirement (LCR) on luck. Jennifer Lackey  has recently argued that there is no such requirement on luck. Should such an argument succeed, it would (among other things) disable a main objection to the "libertarian" position in the free will debate. After clarifying the LCR, I defend it against both Lackey's argument and a novel argument different in kind from Lackey's. I undermine each of these arguments by sketching a plausible error theory for its key intuition. For each argument, there's a natural reply available to its proponents. I show that these natural replies depend on certain mistaken general principles about luck. Neither Lackey's argument nor the novel argument I consider casts serious doubt on the LCR. [Word count: 147].
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References found in this work BETA
A Second Paradox Concerning Responsibility and Luck.John Greco - 1995 - Metaphilosophy 26 (1-2):81-96.
Citations of this work BETA
Anti-Luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief.Nathan Ballantyne - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):485-503.
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