Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind

Minds and Machines 20 (3):423-439 (2010)
We first discuss Michael Dummett’s philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom’s philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church’s Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument
Keywords Mechanism  Church’s thesis  Computational theory of mind  Dualism  Inferentialism  Platonism  Lucas-Penrose argument  Brandom  Dummett  Detlefsen  Wright
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DOI 10.1007/s11023-010-9203-1
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The Emperor's New Mind.Roger Penrose - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
The Taming of the True.Neil Tennant - 1997 - Oxford University Press.

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