Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind

Minds and Machines 20 (3):423-439 (2010)
Authors
Jason Megill
University of Virginia
Jon Cogburn
Louisiana State University
Abstract
We first discuss Michael Dummett’s philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom’s philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church’s Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument
Keywords Mechanism  Church’s thesis  Computational theory of mind  Dualism  Inferentialism  Platonism  Lucas-Penrose argument  Brandom  Dummett  Detlefsen  Wright
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DOI 10.1007/s11023-010-9203-1
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The Emperor's New Mind.Roger Penrose - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
The Taming of the True.Neil Tennant - 1997 - Oxford University Press.

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