Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):195 - 216 (2004)

Jon Cogburn
Louisiana State University
Frederic Fitch’s celebrated reasoning to the conclusion that all truths are known can be interpreted as a reductio of the claim that all truths are knowable. Given this, nearly all of the proof’s reception has involved canvassing the prospects for some form of verificationism. Unfortunately, debates of this sort discount much of the philosophical import of the proof. In addition to its relevance for verificationism, Fitch’s proof is also an argument for the existence of God, one at least as strong as the traditional demonstrations. Perhaps unlike other such proofs, Fitch’s also operates as a key lemma in a proof that establishes that God can’t exist.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0045-5091
DOI 10.1080/00455091.2004.10716565
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,700
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts.Frederic Fitch - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.
A Paradox Regained.D. Kaplan & R. Montague - 1960 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1 (3):79-90.
Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence.George I. Mavrodes - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (2):221-223.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Truth and the Enigma of Knowability.Bernhard Weiss - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (4):521–537.
Truth and the Enigma of Knowability.Bernhard Weiss - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (4):521-537.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
44 ( #235,313 of 2,432,316 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #138,405 of 2,432,316 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes