Rolling Back the Luck Problem for Libertarianism

Abstract

I here sketch a reply to Peter van Inwagen’s Rollback Argument, which suggests that libertarian accounts of free agency are beset by problems involving luck. Van Inwagen imagines an indeterministic agent whose universe is repeatedly ‘rolled back’ by God to the time of her choice. Since the agent’s choice is indeterministic, her choices are sometimes di erent in the imaginary rollback scenarios. I show that although this is true, this need not impair her control over what she does. I develop an account of when and why the fact that an agent would choose di erently impairs control, which provides a novel response to the Rollback Argument.

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References found in this work

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Randolph K. Clarke - 2003 - Oxford University Press USA.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work

Taking Hobart Seriously.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (4):1407-1426.

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