An Essay on Belief and Acceptance

New York: Clarendon Press (1992)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this incisive new book one of Britain's most eminent philosophers explores the often overlooked tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. He seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied, at its best, in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily believe or what they voluntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, the author sheds new light on issues of crucial importance in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,197

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Belief, acceptance, and cognition.Keith Lehrer - 1983 - In Herman [Ed] Parret (ed.), On Believing. De Gruyter. pp. 172-183.
Belief versus acceptance.Raimo Tuomela - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):122 – 137.
Acceptance without belief.J. Mosterin - 2002 - Manuscrito 25 (2):313-35.
Belief and acceptance.Paul Weirich - 2004 - In Ilkka Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen & Jan Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. pp. 499--520.
Acceptance without Belief.Patrick Maher - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:381-392.
Acceptance and deciding to believe.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:173-190.
On the possibility of group knowledge without belief.Raul Hakli - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):249 – 266.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
483 (#39,940)

6 months
30 (#106,968)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Thinking is Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):55-96.
True enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):113–131.
Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.

View all 235 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Paradoxes of Irrationality.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 169–187.
Modelling collective belief.Margaret Gilbert - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):185-204.
Knowledge---by examples.Colin Radford - 1966 - Analysis 27 (1):1--11.
An analysis of self-deception.Kent Bach - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (March):351-370.

View all 10 references / Add more references